

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00482 01 OF 04 081437Z

43

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SP-02 MMO-01 PER-01 CU-02 PM-04 NSC-05

SS-15 PRS-01 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 EB-07 COME-00

TRSE-00 /058 W

----- 042809

R 081038Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 908

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 SOFIA 0482

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EGEN, EEWT, CGEN, US, BU

SUBJECT: 1976 ANNUAL ASSESSMENT -- BULGARIA

REF: A) 75 STATE 289641; B) STATE 042089; C) STATE 047659;

D) 75 SOFIA A-43; E) 75 SOFIA 2295

1. U.S. INTERESTS

A. GENERAL INTERESTS IN BULGARIA AS AN EASTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRY.

-- STABILITY IN EASTERN EUROPE, IN TERMS OF FRIENDLY
RELATIONS BETWEEN BULGARIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS, ES-
PECIALLY THOSE LESS CLOSELY TIED TO THE SOVIET UNION;

-- A REGIME WHICH, WHILE COMMUNIST, DOES NOT DO
VIOLENCE TO THE NATIONAL TRADITIONS AND ASPIRATIONS
OF ITS PEOPLE, AND WHICH HAS SUFFICIENT CONSENT OF
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00482 01 OF 04 081437Z

THE GOVERNED TO MAKE PRESENCE OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES

UNNECESSARY;

-- RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, INCLUDING THE U.S., THAT MAKE FOR GREATER OPENNESS IN ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND PERSONAL CONTACTS, TO DIMINISH RELIANCE ON USSR WITHOUT GIVING RISE TO SOVIET FEARS ABOUT THE RELIABILITY OF THE REGIME.

B. SPECIAL INTERESTS DUE TO BULGARIA'S GEOGRAPHIC POSITION.

-- CORRECT, REASONABLY CORDIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BULGARIA AND ITS NATO NEIGHBORS, GREECE AND TURKEY;

-- BULGARIAN RESTRAINT VIS-A-VIS YUGOSLAVIA, PARTICULARLY IN THE EVENT OF TROUBLE IN THAT COUNTRY AFTER THE DEMISE OF PRESIDENT TITO.

2. COMMENTS ON SECTION 1:

A. THE BASIC RECOGNITION IN THE EUROPARA-BULGARIA, ENDORSED IN OUR LAST ANNUAL ASSESSMENT AND RECONFIRMED IN THE INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUPWVS COMMENTS, REMAINS IN EFFECT -- THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR INTEREST TO SEEK TO CHALLENGE DIRECTLY THE DOMINANT SOVIET ROLE IN BULGARIA; THAT IN FACT "TACIT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT" OF THAT SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IS DESIRABLE BECAUSE IT MAY ENABLE US GRADUALLY TO BREAK DOWN SOME OF THE EXISTING BARRIERS BETWEEN BULGARIA AND THE UNITED STATES; AND THAT, INDEED, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT "GRUDGING SOVIET TOLERATION OF ROMANIAN AND YUGOSLAV (THE PARA ALSO ADDED ALBANIAN) INDEPENDENCE RESULTS IN PART FROM THE SOVIET CONVICTION OF BULGARIA'S RELIABILITY."

B. IN SO FAR AS 1 B IS CONCERNED, WHILE WE BELIEVE THAT YUGOSLAV INSISTENCE ON "RIGHTS FOR THE MACEDONIAN MINORITY" IN BULGARIA REPRESENTS THE KIND OF MEDDLING IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS WE WOULD NOT CONDONE IF RESORTED TO BY BULGARIA IN, SAY, GREECE, IT APPARENTLY IS INTENDED FOR YUGOSLAV DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION AND TO KEEP THE BULGARIANS SOMEWHAT OFF BALANCE; AND SO FAR IT DOES NOT INTERFERE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00482 01 OF 04 081437Z

WITH NORMAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

C. PARA 2 REF A CALLED ALSO FOR AN EVALUATION "WHERE (BULGARIA) FITS INTO US POLICY PRIORITIES." IT FITS, IN OUR OPINION, INTO THE CATEGORY OF SOVIET SATELLITES (GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY) WHICH HAVE VIRTUALLY NO LEEWAY IN THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES. THE MOST IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BULGARIA AND THOSE OTHER EE COUNTRIES IS THAT THE

SOVIETS HAVE NO TROOPS IN BULGARIA BECAUSE THE REGIME DOES NOT NEED THEM TO STAY IN POWER. THIS DOES NOT, OF COURSE, CALL FOR ANY PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR BULGARIA; NEITHER, HOWEVER, IS IT A REASON TO RANK BULGARIA BEHIND EE COUNTRIES WHOSE GOVERNMENTS ARE MORE UNPOPULAR AND EQUALLY SUBSERVIENT.

3. BASIC US POLICY OBJECTIVES OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS.

A. LONG-TERM: BREAK DOWN THE INSULARITY AND PROVINCIALISM OF BULGARIA'S LEADERSHIP AND SUB-ELITES, SO THAT AT LEAST IN MATTERS THAT ARE NOT OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO THE USSR, THEY WILL EVENTUALLY THINK MORE IN TERMS OF NATIONAL SELF-INTEREST, OR IN TERMS OF THE MERITS OF ISSUES, RATHER THAN BY REFLEX.

B. SHORT-TERM: SETTLEMENT OF THE REMAINING ISSUES INVOLVING BONDHOLDER CLAIMS AND DIVIDED FAMILIES.

C. BOTH LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM: BROADEN US ACCESS TO BULGARIAN LEADERSHIP AND SUB-ELITES; INCREASE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE; AND MAKE INTERCOURSE WITH THE US OVER A BROAD SPECTRUM SO VISIBLE THAT IT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE BUREAUCRACY AND SUB-ELITES AS A "NORMAL" FEATURE OF OUR RELATIONS.

4. COMMENTS ON SECTION 3:

A. WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT WASHINGTON IS ALLERGIC TO HIGH-LEVEL VISITS WHEN THERE IS NO IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE BUSINESS TO TRANSACT, BUT OBJECTIVE C CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED, IN TERMS OF THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION IN BULGARIA, BY HIGHLY VISIBLE CONTACTS, I.E. HIGH-LEVEL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SOFIA 00482 01 OF 04 081437Z

VISITS (HOWEVER SHORT)
IN EITHER DIRECTION.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00482 02 OF 04 081304Z

43

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SP-02 MMO-01 PER-01 CU-02 PM-04 NSC-05

SS-15 PRS-01 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 EB-07 COME-00

TRSE-00 /058 W

----- 041772

R 081038Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 909

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 SOFIA 0482

B. THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT RELAXATION OF TENSION AND TRADE AND CONTACTS, WHICH ARE CORRECTLY ADDUCED TO JUSTIFY A GROWING WEB OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE USSR AS PART OF A STRUCTURE OF PEACE, APPLY EQUALLY TO BULGARIA.

5. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE SINCE LAST ASSESSMENT.

THE RECORD IS MIXED, AND WE ARE AT A JUNCTURE WHERE IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE WHETHER WE HAVE REALLY MADE MUCH PROGRESS.

ON THE POSITIVE SIDE THERE WERE (A) THE INGERSOLL VISIT AND SOME HIGHLY POSITIVE STATEMENTS MADE TO HIM BY ZHIVKOV ON SPECIFIC ISSUES; (B) INCEPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON CULTURAL/SCIENTIFIC AGREEMENT, WITH INITIAL BULGARIAN RECEPTIVENESS; (C) THE FIRST MEETING OF THE US-BULGARIAN ECONOMIC COUNCIL, AMID FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERICS; (D) FURTHER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00482 02 OF 04 081304Z

INCREASE IN TRADE, THOUGH AT LESS DRAMATIC RATE THEN BETWEEN 1973 AND 1974; (E) SPECIFICALLY, AWARD TO A US GROUP OF THE FIRST (OVERALL) CONTRACT FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING OF THE GIANT SILISTRA PROJECT; (F) THE FIRST US CULTURAL PRESENTATION, WHOSE SMASHING SUCCESS MAY HAVE TAKEN THE REGIME ABACK; (G) MOVEMENT TOWARD LIMITED INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF AGRICULTURE.

ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE WERE (A) VIRTUAL NON-PERFORMANCE OF THE BULGARIANS ON SOME OF THE SWEEPING STATEMENTS MADE BY ZHIVKOV TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY -- ALTHOUGH ALL THE RETURNS ARE NOT YET IN; (B) IN THE LAST MONTH OR SO, A DRAWING-BACK OF THE BULGARIANS FROM PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED PARTICIPATION IN A US-SPONSORED LABOR SEMINAR AND OF A VISIT OF CUSTOMS OFFICIALS (WHO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH US IN NARCOTICS MATTERS); (C) AN INCREASE IN IDEOLOGICAL COMBATIVENESS, WITH THE US THE SUBJECT OF MORE MALICIOUS CARTOONS; (D) A POSSIBLE HARDENING IN SOME DIVIDED FAMILY MATTERS, INCLUDING ONE CASE WHERE BULGARIANS CLAIM THE US IS PREVENTING FAMILY UNIFICATION.

ON BALANCE, WE THINK THE PLUSES OUTWEIGH THE MINUSES; BUT, PARTLY ALSO BECAUSE WE STARTED FROM A HIGHER LEVEL, THE DEGREE OF PROGRESS IS LESS THAN DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE US AMBASSADOR CONTINUES TO HAVE GOOD ACCESS TO BULGARIAN POLICYMAKERS AND THAT THE BULGARIANS AT LEAST CLAIMED TO BE READY TO TURN OVER A NEW LEAF WITH RESPECT TO DIVIDED FAMILIES AND SOME OF THE BASKET III ISSUES.

6. IDENTIFICATION OF FUTURE TRENDS AND PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT AFFECT U.S. INTERESTS.

A. WHILE OVERALL TRADE WENT UP BETWEEN 1974 AND 1975, THE PROPORTION WITH NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES RETURNED TO THE SAME LEVEL (APPROXIMATELY 20 PERCENT) AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS. THIS WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE, BUT SINCE TOTAL TRADE IS EXPANDING IT STILL LEAVES ROOM FOR SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED TRADE WITH THE US.

B. WE EXPECT THE YUGOSLAVS TO CONTINUE PRESSING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00482 02 OF 04 081304Z

THE BULGARIANS WITH RESPECT TO THE MACEDONIAN MINORITY IN BULGARIA, AND THE LATTER TO REFRAIN FROM HITTING BACK AS LONG AS THAT POSTURE SUITS SOVIET INTERESTS.

C. RELATIONS WITH GREECE HAVE TAKEN A QUANTUM JUMP UPWARD; AND THIS HAS NOT BEEN AT THE EXPENSE OF RELATIONS WITH TURKEY -- NO MEAN FEAT. WE DO NOT SEE ANY TREND TOWARD REGIONALISM IN THE BALKANS IN BULGARIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, ALTHOUGH LIMITED COOPERATION WITH CARAMANLIS WILL CONTINUE.

D. FACT THAT BULGARIA, WHICH HAS NO MAJOR ISSUE WITH THE US, IS THE ONLY COUNTRY IN EUROPE THAT HAS NOT BEEN VISITED BY A SECRETARY OF STATE (OR US PRES OR VICE PRES)

WILL CONTINUE TO RANKLE, PERHAPS INCREASINGLY SO. "LACK OF TIME" WILL NOT BE A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION SINCE US LEADERS SO FREQUENTLY VISIT BUCHAREST AND BELGRADE, AND A STOP OF A FEW HOURS IN BETWEEN WOULD NOT BE TIME-CONSUMING.

7. COMMENTS ON SECTION 6. QUESTIONS IN PARA 2 REF C DID NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO DISCUSSION IN THE ABOVE FORMAT, AND ARE THUS ADDRESSED HERE SEPARATELY, WITH LETTERS CORRESPONDING TO THOSE OF SUB-PARAGRAPHS REFTEL:

A. EFFECT OF SOVIET AND YUGOSLAV SUCCESSION ON US INTERESTS IN BULGARIA. WE SEE NO LIKELY EFFECT ON BULGARIA'S POLICY (AS DISTINGUISHED FROM POSSIBLE EFFECT ON POSITION OF ZHIVKOV) FROM ANY MAJOR LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN MOSCOW. FEAR THAT BULGARIA MAY ACT AS THE SOVIET UNION'S CAT'S PAW AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA AT ANY TIME IS FULLY JUSTIFIED. IF THE SOVIETS WISH THE BULGARIANS TO STIR UP TROUBLE, WE THINK THEY WOULD GLEEFULLY OBLIGE. THIS WOULD NOT BE IN OUR INTEREST, BUT IT IS HARD TO SEE WHAT PRESSURE WE COULD APPLY, OR WHAT BENEFITS WE COULD WITHHOLD, TO MAKE THEM DESIST. (ANY RECOURSE WOULD HAVE TO BE HAD PRIMARILY IN MOSCOW.)

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00482 03 OF 04 081317Z

43

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SP-02 MMO-01 PER-01 CU-02 PM-04 NSC-05

SS-15 PRS-01 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 EB-07 COME-00

TRSE-00 /058 W

----- 041936

R 081038Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 910

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 SOFIA 0482

B. BULGARIA'S ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ARE GREATLY EXPANDED AS THE COUNTRY HAS GAINED A GOOD DEAL OF "RESPECTABILITY" IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THIRD WORLD -- INDEED, TOO MUCH SO CONSIDERING ITS ABILITY TO FUNCTION AS SHOW WINDOW OF COMMUNISM FOR SOME UN AGENCIES, AND ITS APPARENT SUCCESS IN COZENING SOME NON-COMMUNIST GROUPS IN OTHER COUNTRIES THROUGH THE BULGARIAN AGRARIAN UNION. THIS INCREASED ACTIVITY IS CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH USSR. WE SEE NO OPPORTUNITIES TO OBTAIN BULGARIAN COOPERATION ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS WHICH ARE OF IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION. STILL, WE SHOULD KEEP TRYING, IF ONLY BECAUSE OUR EFFORTS MAY HAVE SOME INDIRECT EFFECT ON THE USSR.

C. ABSENCE OF MFN IS ONLY A LIMITED OBSTACLE TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF US-BULGARIAN RELATIONS. IT IS NOT A REASON WHY SUCH DEVELOPMENT NEED BE SLOW, NOR IS THERE ANY REASON TO FEAR THAT THE USSR WOULD LOOK ASKANCE AT A LESS LEISURELY PACE IN DEVELOPMENT OF THOSE RELATIONS,
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00482 03 OF 04 081317Z

AS EXPLAINED IN OUR LAST ASSESSMENT. ALSO, THE BULGARIANS COULDN'T CARE LESS WHETHER THEY RANK AHEAD OR BEHIND CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY IN SPECIFIC STEPS WE TAKE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THEM. IT'S ALL IN OUR OWN MINDS, A GAME WE'RE PLAYING WITH OURSELVES, AND HAS NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE REALITIES OF OUR RELATIONS. "SEQUENCING" IS THUS ESSENTIALLY AN EXERCISE IN SELF-GRATIFICATION.

D. BULGARIA WOULD PROBABLY LIKE TO PLAY A ROLE IN REGIONAL BALKAN INSTITUTIONS. BUT AS LONG AS THE USSR WORRIES ABOUT IT, THE GOB WILL DRAG ITS HEELS BECAUSE BALKAN COOPERATION IS OF VERY, VERY MINOR IMPORTANCE IN COMPARISON TO RELATIONS WITH THE USSR.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS ON COURSES OF ACTION.

WE RECOMMEND NO MAJOR INITIATIVES DURING THE COMING YEAR. "SLOW AND STEADY" SHOULD BE OUR WATCHWORD, BUT WITH THE EMPHASIS ON STEADY. IN ONE RESPECT, HOWEVER, WE RECOMMEND RAISING OUR SIGHTS. WHEREAS IN LAST YEAR'S ASSESSMENT WE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT SETTLEMENT OF BONDHOLDERS' CLAIMS AND DIVIDED FAMILIES ISSUE WOULD COME ONLY WHEN WE ARE IN POSITION TO OFFER MFN, WE NOW BELIEVE WE CAN EXPLOIT BULGARIA'S PROFESSED READINESS TO SETTLE THOSE ISSUES, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF MFN.

A. CONCLUDE THE CULTURAL/SCIENTIFIC AGREEMENT AS
SOON AS GOB IS READY TO DO SO.

B. IN THIS CONNECTION, FILL THE VOID EXISTING
DUE TO ABSENCE OF ANY PROJECTED HIGH-LEVEL VISITS IN
EITHER DIRECTION DURING 1976 -- A STEP BACKWARD IN COM-
PARISON TO 1974 AND 1975 -- BY HAVING THE SIGNING TAKE
PLACE IN WASHINGTON. THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY
INVITING NACHO PAPAZOV, HEAD OF THE COMMITTEE OF SCIENCE,
TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND HIGHER EDUCATION, TO WASHINGTON
FOR THAT PURPOSE. WHILE HE IS OF MINISTERIAL RANK, HE
HAS EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO COMBINE SUCH VISIT WITH A
REGULAR IVP TOUR OF THE US.

C. GIVE CONTINUING CONSIDERATION TO MAKING USE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00482 03 OF 04 081317Z

OF TRAVEL BY HIGH U.S. OFFICIALS (INCLUDING CABINET LEVEL,
ASIDE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE) TO THIS AREA FOR MAKING
BRIEF STOPOVERS IN BULGARIA.

D. USE AN EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS OF SECRETARY
KISSINGER TO STOP OFF IN BULGARIA DURING HIS NEXT VISIT TO
BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, ATHENS OR THE NEAR EAST, AS "SOMETHING
TO WITHHOLD" IN CONNECTION WITH BULGARIAN PERFORMANCE ON
AN ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE TO US, E.G. THE BEHAVIOR OF THE
BULGARIAN VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
ON THE PUERTO RICO ISSUE.

E. PUSH HARD ON DIVIDED FAMILIES, GETTING AS MUCH
MILEAGE AS WE CAN OUT OF ZHIVKOV'S CAVALIER REMARK TO
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY INDICATING THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO
WIPE OUT THIS IRRITANT TO OUR RELATIONS. (NOT ALL
CASES WILL BE SETTLED, BUT WITH ANOTHER MAJOR PUSH OR
TWO OR THREE, WE MIGHT OBTAIN A QUANTUM JUMP IN
APPROVALS.)

F. CONTINUE TO FACILITATE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREE-
MENT WITH THE BONDHOLDERS COUNCIL.

G. GRANT PERMISSION TO BULGARIA TO OPEN THE TWO
COMMERCIAL OFFICES IN THE US WHICH IT REQUESTED ALMOST
TWO YEARS AGO, AS A MATTER OF BENEFIT TO BOTH COUNTRIES.

H. CONCLUDE THE "STATEMENT" ON COOPERATION IN THE
FIELD OF AGRICULTURE BETWEEN THE US AND BULGARIA, AND
UTILIZE THAT OCCASION FOR A HIGH-LEVEL VISIT (SUB-CABINET
LEVEL WOULD BE SUFFICIENT) IN EITHER DIRECTION.

I. KEEP UP PRESSURE FOR BULGARIAN COMPLIANCE WITH

BASKET III MATTERS, NOTABLY THE FREER DISSEMINATION OF
WESTERN PUBLICATIONS THAT THEY CLAIM HAS ALREADY BEGUN.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00482 04 OF 04 081330Z

43

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SP-02 MMO-01 PER-01 CU-02 PM-04 NSC-05

SS-15 PRS-01 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 EB-07 COME-00

TRSE-00 /058 W

----- 042035

R 081038Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 911

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 SOFIA 0482

I.J. RESOURCES: WE HAVE ONLY TWO IMPORTANT RECOM-
MENDATIONS, AND THEY ARE MADE WITH REDOWRLED EMPHASIS.
MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT THIS EMBASSY BE GIVEN ONE MORE
POSITION, DESIGNATED AS CONSULAR/COMMERCIAL OFFICER. IN
ADDITION TO THE SHARPLY INCREASED WORKLOAD IN BOTH OUR
CONSULAR AND COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS, THERE IS A REASON
WHICH CONCERNS ANOTHER AGENCY. CONSIDERING THAT THE
OVERHEAD APPARATUS OF THIS EMBASSY IS IN PLACE AND
QUITE EXPENSIVE, ADDITION OF THIS ONE POSITION WOULD
GREATLY IMPROVE OUR OUTPUT AND EFFICIENCY WITH RELATIVELY
LITTLE ADDITIONAL EXPENSE.

K. EMBASSY SOFIA OCCUPIES WITHOUT A DOUBT THE
CRUMMIEST AND ALSO THE LEAST SECURE CHANCERY AMONG EE
POSTS. (WHEN SENATOR HRUSKA WAS HERE IN 1974, HE APTLY
DESCRIBED OUR CHANCERY AS "REALLY GRIM.") WE SHOULD
CONTINUE TO SEEK FUNDS FOR EARLY ACQUISITION OF LAND,

SO THAT CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW BUILDING CAN COMMENCE WITHIN
THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00482 04 OF 04 081330Z

9. AMBASSADOR WILL BE IN WASHINGTON BEGINNING APRIL 2,
AND IF THE INTER-AGENCY REVIEW HAS NOT YET TAKEN PLACE
BY THAT TIME WOULD BE PLEASED TO PARTICIPATE IN IT DURING
HIS CONSULTATION THERE.

HERZ

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 MAR 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ullricre
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976SOFIA00482
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760087-0338
From: SOFIA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760384/aaaacvxy.tel
Line Count: 507
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 76 STATE 289641, 76 STATE 42089, 76 STATE 47659
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ullricre
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <09 APR 2004 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <30 JUL 2004 by ullricre>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: 1976 ANNUAL ASSESSMENT -- BULGARIA
TAGS: PFOR, EGEN, EEWT, CGEN, US, BU
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006